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ARE WE KEEPING THE REPUBLIC?

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Senator Pell, I feel honored to be in your presence. Your record in the Senate is well established, and I must say that many times I agreed with you even though I was against you. The title of the talk was changed recently. I was in Beijing, and I had a thought and the thought was of Benjamin Franklin and the thought was also of what James Madison in Federalist Paper Number 51 talked about what was unique to the *Republic* and I emphasize that word, of that Republic that was formed or at least constituted during those hot days of July 1787. And I thought I needed to change my title and need to respond to the question, “Are we keeping the Republic?”

I am going to take a little diversion here, and I am going to tell you what I told the corps of cadets at Virginia Tech on the 18th of January. That corps constitutes another element of keeping the Republic, perhaps one of the most important elements when the Republic is truly threatened.

I went to Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia with a text in my pocket and I was quite sure that as an academic and a former soldier and as a person who had been from 2001 to 2005 in the administration that currently rules, I could speak to these cadets from the script and not deviate from it too much, and I wouldn't do any harm, and perhaps I would do some good. I get into the room and arrayed before me in this really wonderful room (it's sort of like a physics lab with everybody sitting little higher than everybody else or like an IMAX theater) was this group of cadets. And I could see every one of them and my first thought was, “how young they are.” Later, at dinner with the captain of the cadets and with several others sitting at my table I remarked once again how young these men and women looked and how they were already in their uniform. Virginia Tech has a seven hundred and fifty-member corps of cadets. It's huge. I learned that that 70 percent of the corps of cadets

of Virginia Tech go on to active duty immediately after graduation. Seventy percent. At VMI, The Citadel, Texas A&M, it is rarely more than thirty percent. I learned this from the general who was the commandant of cadets at Virginia Tech as I walked in the room. All these young men and women I was looking at or at least three quarter of them were going to go to Afghanistan or Iraq or go into the ships or airplanes that are supporting the war. Subsequently, I found out how many of them were going into the Army or Marine corps; probably half of them. So, I mentally threw my script away.

I started talking to them about our Republic, about the history of that Republic. I had a book with me and I took it out of my briefcase. It was Douglas Southall Freeman's sixth volume of his seven-volume set on George Washington. We don't have historians anymore like Douglas Southall Freeman. What an extraordinary man. He dedicated his life to Robert E. Lee, George Washington and Richmond, Virginia. I described and then read from the book, because you cannot add to Douglas Southall Freeman; you must read it. I described the situation in Newburgh, New York on the Hudson River above West Point, where we were between the Battle of Yorktown, where we had been so victorious and the peace treaty which would come months and months later. After all, we were fighting Great Britain, the greatest empire in the world economically, politically, and militarily. The only way we were going to win was not to lose. If Britain had not Napoleon around at the time, they probably would have dispatched another army to put us away quickly. Or at least it would have been a lot harder to not lose.

So, Washington and his men are all caught in this interregnum. Is peace coming or is it not? We beat you soundly at Yorktown, is it coming? He is desultorily planning an attack on New York City. He really doesn't know what to do. And all of a sudden, well not all of a

sudden but in a short time, he finds out he has a major, major problem. He's got a mutiny on his hand.

In fact, because of short rations—the cadets asked me what short rations were and I said it is when your defense contractor—you know the early version of the defense contractor—takes three quarters of your food, the food that is supposed to go to the Army and sends it off to the black market or to the open market and makes a fortune off the food. Those guys were war profiteers and the soldiers had uniforms that did not have a full complement of wool, and weapons that did not work for the same reason. And most of all the soldiers did not have any pay from that Congress in Philadelphia. And they were not looking for any pension or half-pay or whatever it would turn out to be. And so they were getting ready to revolt, and they had two proposals: they were either going to take their weapons and march on Philadelphia, or they were going to go into wilderness with their weapons and form an independent republic. Washington did not think it was all that serious. He read some of their pamphlets and anonymous letters, but Alexander Hamilton told him, “They are serious and you better go yourself.” And so he did. He went to a little place called Temple, a wooden building which had been used for dances and other things, and there in Newburgh and he addressed his regional commanders. You know the rest of the story. This is where he tells them essentially that he thinks he hasn't been very persuasive. He adjusts his new glasses and says, “*Gentlemen, you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in the service of my country.*” And by just that, this sterling man changed the regional commanders' minds. And we are back headed towards the Republic we eventually became.

And as I told the cadets: what a moment in history and what a character without which we would not be who we are today. Freeman makes this moment very, very poignant

and graphic in that particular chapter, quoting Washington's words to make that effect. Words that almost foreshadow Lincoln's "the last best hope of earth." Well, the last best hope of earth didn't expire that day. And so then I tried to tell these people who are ultimately ordered by the state, *our* state, our republic to kill in the name of the state, and indeed to risk their own lives and limbs in the defense of that state, or in the prosecution of its policies, why they should be like Washington, and not as he said in his correspondence with the New York legislature in June of 1776, "Lay aside the citizen when they assume the soldier."

"How do you do that?" asked one cadet, "Because our minds are troubled. Our minds are troubled by our military leadership and our civilian leadership."

And then we got into the brass tacks and the nitty-gritty. And of course, I could do but one thing and that was ultimately to tell them that it was up to them, to their consciences, to their minds, to their personal beliefs, their deliberations, their family's deliberations, and so forth. But if they chose to serve, their ultimate mission in life was to thirty-six, thirty-seven, forty or whatever it turned out to be men and women whom they would lead. In most cases men, if they were in the infantry. And I told them that this would be the be-all and end-all of their lives. The more of these men and women they brought home, indeed if they brought themselves home, intact, the more successful that professional debut would be. That's all I could say to them. And the Q&A afterwards and the dinner afterwards, of course, we explored many more dimensions of this challenge these young men and these young women are confronted with. Believe me the turmoil in their minds hangs heavy on their souls.

And so I come back to the original question, "Are we keeping the Republic?" As an academic, I would like to say that we have kept it, however imperfectly, pretty well until

1945. And then from 1945, at the end of World War II, where we stood like Colossus astride the world, when no one out there could even remotely compete with us, with the possible exception of twenty million Soviet soldiers who could have crossed the English Channel in a heartbeat, but we dropped two bombs on Japan that showed them they shouldn't, we were unparalleled, our power was at its peak. Certainly given our history, it was at its peak.

And then, a constellation of men and women came together. A constellation not much different in my mind to the constellation of men and women who came together in Philadelphia that hot summer of 1787, men like George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower and Dean Acheson, Harry Truman, Arleigh Burke, Ferdinand Eberstadt and James Forrestal, we could go on and on and talk about these men who forged the compromise that would deal with that power, the power of the new Rome, if you will. To deal with that power and yet save, at the same time, the Republic, the democratic Republic that our founding fathers had constituted. It wasn't easy. From the creation of the CIA, the creation of the national Security Council, to the unification of the armed forces. And boy, did they get their wish when they unified the armed forces under the national military establishment, later to be called the Department of Defense. Boy, did they get their best wish, trying to make it the equal to the State Department, trying to make it a better, more effective, more efficient organization and now it is the pre-imminent instrument of our bureaucracy with some half to three quarters of a trillion dollars when the State Department gets only thirty billion dollars. Did they get their wishes? You bet they did. And these young men and women are going to find that out when they grow and prosper or not in their profession.

But they compromised marvelously, and they continued to compromise president after president from Harry Truman all the way up to Ronald Reagan. They compromised between the tension of the national security state, the need for security against a monolithic

threat with an ideology that was world-sweeping and the need to protect our traditional cultural and political values and, however imperfectly, they by and large did a pretty good job. Until we arrived at the end of what they put that apparatus together to defeat, the Soviet Union, the Cold War. And then, we get George Herbert Walker Bush and Bill Clinton sort of strategically muddling through the end of the Cold War, but still trying to maintain that compromise. Michael Lind has a book called “The American Way of Strategy.” I disagree with him completely because he says that the great changes in strategy and strategic approach to the world for America occurred with George Herbert Walker Bush in the first Gulf War. I don’t see that. I see the first Gulf War as being fought under very specific circumstances and being fought multilaterally with international cooperation rather than unilaterally.

So I don’t see what Lind is talking about, but I buy his argument that we changed our strategic approach. We decided, in my view, in January of 2001 with the new administration of George W. Bush to become the world’s hegemon. No multilateral cooperation to screen it, no international need to screen it, just us being the world’s hegemon. And from that point on, Lind says, we dictated our demise. Fiscally, because it will bankrupt us, and morally and ethically because we can no longer be the democratic Republic that our founders put together and that we worked so diligently to preserve once our power situation had changed in 1945 and we had worked out a compromise.

People say, “Well, it happened after 9/11. It happened after 9/11 because it had to happen after 9/11.” I don’t think so. I think it happened with the arrival of Vice President Richard Bruce Cheney and President George W. Bush in the White House, aided and abetted by a number of other people but, nonetheless, *that* was the power that decided that unilateralism and being the world’s hegemon was a new strategy for America. All you have

to do, I think, is to go and look hard—and historians are going to do with this a lot better than I've done—at the policies that began to be identified with the administration from the very beginning. Whether you want to look at ballistic missile defense and the abnegation of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty, Kyoto and its rejection—even though it was flawed and had no cooperation and no follow-up and no international process to devise a follow-up—whether you want to look at the other foreign-policy mistakes, in my view, that were made at that time. For example, telling Nobel Peace Prize winner President Kim Dae Jong of South Korea that his policy [Sunshine Policy of rapprochement between North and South Korea] was full of it and that we were going to design a new one. And, by God, now we see the result of this new policy after five years of its failure. Another example was the beginning of the structure of going after the Middle East in this messianic desire to bring democracy and freedom to the Middle East which masked a desire, as I think the papers of Richard Bruce Cheney will prove, if they ever come to light, to really make sure that the second largest oil reserves in the world were dealt with in an expeditious, efficient, and effective way and that Israel be protected from the threat that Iraq represented. I could go on. It had nothing to do with previous foreign policy.

There was a break. There was no continuity and the break was caused in an intelligent, knowing, witting way even though the way we saw the break executed subsequent to that was one of the most inept and incompetent things one could ever see because first of all, you can't decide to be the world's hegemon if your legions are tiny. You would have needed me to go down to Virginia Tech and talk to *several thousands* of young men and women not just seven hundred and fifty. You would have needed to increase the strength of the land forces of this Republic by ten-fold at least if you were going to be the Rome of the 21st century. We didn't do that. We would have needed to mobilize the country. We would

have needed to bring into the fray more than one half of one percent of three hundred million people to wage this long, defense contractor-necessary, war against Islamo-fascists. You would have needed to make a whole lot more decisions about how you were going to craft this instrument that was going to be your principal foreign-policy instrument, the Armed Forces of the United States, for *ad nauseam* into the future. We didn't do that. We did spend enormous amounts of money to the tune of \$1.2 trillion, at the end of fiscal year 2007, making it the second most expensive war in our history, second only to the Second World War. We did do it in some other ways that are now resounding, to our discredit, all across the globe fiscally and otherwise. But we did not do it in the way that we are the new Rome and we should admit to it, as Niall Ferguson the Scottish historian wants us to, and get over it and execute our responsibilities vis-à-vis that empire. We didn't create the legions. We didn't put the taxes in place. We didn't do any of that, but we *did* change our strategy and now are paying for it.

There is one other omission we made. We did not consult the American people. We did not talk to the American people about changing from the Monroe doctrine and the hegemony of the Western Hemisphere and the cooperation and concert of power elsewhere to defeat threats in the heartland of Europe or in Asia. We just changed. We changed. The American people were never consulted and after September 11th you can argue that they did not need to be consulted because they were frightened and that they would pretty much take anything. Maybe take NSA wiretapping. It has been going on since 1923. The predecessors to the NSA did the same thing. They used to take telegrams from Western Union and go to the basement of the White House and read them and then resealed them and take them back. The difference today is technology. Now, we can read *everything*. We can read everything in *nanoseconds*. Technology is there to be incredibly abusive of your civil liberties.

No one has explained that to you. Michael Hayden hasn't. John Negroponte hasn't. Alberto Gonzalez hasn't, and the president hasn't. No one has explained that to you, the change with regard to the NSA's ability to look into your life.

For the first time in our history that I could find, we have publicly advocated, indeed the vice-president of the United States actually lobbied the United States Congress for torture. Detainee abuse was *not* something some bad apples did. It was authorized at the highest levels of the United States government. We are still not where we should be on that matter. The Military Commissions Act didn't do anything but obfuscate and deny. We still have a problem with *habeas corpus*. We still have a problem with people doing things that they should not be doing, although I will tell you that right now that all the professionals at the CIA tell me they are not going to do a thing because they are scared. They are scared of the new president; they are scared of the new Congress, for indeed we have a new Congress. They are scared of war crimes trials, not international trials but domestic trials. We broke *domestic* law. And I haven't even talked about the fiscal record of this administration.

The other day, I was at the house, talking to some of my Republican friends. Thirty of them were assembled. We were talking and they were all enraged, *Republicans* from Texas, from Virginia, from North Carolina, from Oklahoma; they are enraged. They are enraged over the Iraq war, but they are also enraged about the budget. Sixty percent of the money appropriated for this war has been appropriated off-line, in supplementals. One old member of the House who is eighty-six years old told me he had just come off the floor of the House having given a speech about the gold standard.

I said, "Congressman, the gold standard?" He said,

"Oh I wasn't advocating a return to it. I was advocating we *get* a standard other than how much ink and paper we have."

Then he looked at me and said, “Do you know where \$12 of every West Texas intermediate barrel, the benchmark crude into petroleum industry, do you know where that \$12 comes from? It comes from the depreciation of the dollar, not the increase in oil prices.” And he went on and on and I finally stopped him and I said, “What are you guys going to do about it?” And then, and then disarray broke out. They don’t know what to do. It is their party. It is my party. They want their party back. I want my party back. I don’t recognize my party.

So how do you talk about this sort of things to young men and young women who are going to go out and kill for state purposes and maybe get killed themselves? It is very hard. It is very difficult. And I have to ask myself every time I speak; am I damaging the cause; am I hurting these young men and young women; am I causing their jobs to be more potentially difficult; am I adding to the weight upon their shoulders? Or am I helping? I went outside and saw a bumper sticker that says “Dissent is the highest form of patriotism.” And I think “Yes, maybe you are doing some good.” But it is still torture just walking into a room and watching these young men and women knowing what they have to do. And I bring my experience from Vietnam, but I did not learn about Vietnam in an academic sense or an intellectual sense until I had already done my time. And I had saved as many men and women as I could and I had prosecuted the war, and had made sure, *damn sure* that none of my men—they were all men then—committed anything close to a war crime. I felt like that was a successful time in Vietnam.

But these young men and women are already involved in the turmoil of the mind. Because it is clear to them that the military and civilian leadership of this nation have made mistakes, told some lies, have not been honest with the American people and it is ultimately to the Constitution and the American people that these young men and these young women

feel their greatest responsibility. When they take the oath, it is to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic. And I tell them, “When you go to the Jefferson Memorial in Washington, and you see those beautiful words engraved in marble around the interior where Jefferson says *“I have sworn on the altar of God eternal hostility to all forms of tyranny over the minds of man,”* you must understand that Jefferson meant first the priest, and then second his own government, then he meant the external enemy. So when you say you must be eternally vigilant for *“The price of liberty is eternal vigilance,”* look first inside your own leadership.” And we have not been looking hard enough inside our own leadership.

When we talk, Secretary Powell and I still have some discussions about this. He is a product of the executive branch: he was National Security Advisor, Deputy National Security Advisor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, Secretary of State. He, a product of the executive branch, is wont to defend the executive branch, its prerogative, and its power. I come back and say to him “I don’t have your experience in the executive branch, but I do know that there is another separate and equal branch of government and I don’t like it when the scales get out of balance for whatever reason.” And you can argue all day long, and I would be there with you, that one of the reasons the scales are out of balance is because the Republicans reneged on their responsibility to exercise oversight over what is becoming a tyranny in the White House. I use that term guardedly, but nonetheless use it because what the Greeks would have said about tyranny is “When there is a crisis, bring on Pericles and all his armies but when the crisis is over, send him home.” But now the crisis is endless. By the administration’s own admission the crisis is endless. On the State of the Union last night [January 23, 2007], the president asked or told his audience that no one wanted failure. I bet you that in four hundred at least of the minds in that assembly, of the

five hundred and thirty-five members, they were thinking, “All you’ve given us, Mr. President, is failure. From one subject to the next all you have given us is failure.”

That’s an exaggeration. The HIV/AIDS program and the Millennium Challenge Account and others are I think positive developments. Not as positive as they might be, but at least they are a positive. But the bulk of this administration’s legacy is going to be abject failure. What I am trying to say is that we do not want to make the legacy of this administration, the legacy of our republic. And to say that all we need is a new Congress and a new president and a new National Security Advisor and a new group of principals to parade around the president, I think it is a copout.

Ever since 1945, we have been moving inexorably towards the national security state; towards a president who turns *first* to his military, to the instrument of power that is the easiest for him to use, and the most readily available. We have let the difference between diplomacy and military power become *incredibly* great in the scheme of things. All you have to do is look at three quarters of a trillion dollars the Department of Defense versus thirty billion dollars for the Department of State to understand that. All you have to do is look at the two and a half million men and women who array themselves in a uniform as opposed to the five thousand who array themselves as Foreign Service Officers. All you have to do is take a good hard look at the executive and what the President can touch quickly and effectively and throw out there to understand that increasingly we are going to turn to the military instrument. It is not just because we are the new Rome or the new empire or that we have to protect our assets around the world; it is because it is *simple* to do.

And many will tell you, and this is truly alarming, as Strobe Talbott told Colin Powell when he came out of the Military Command Service in 1992, Powell being Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, “How does it feel, General, to be part of the only institution

in the American government that works?” Increasingly, that is the reality. The military *does* work. It works well, fast, efficiently, and usually effectively. But there is so much more to managing power, and to international cooperation, and international relations than the military instrument. And yet, we have let those other elements of our powers atrophy in the name of executive power. That’s wrong. In my opinion, that is not the way to keep the Republic. It is dangerous and it is deadly from a number of perspectives and I’ll close with just one of those perspectives.

We are now developing an extraordinary chasm between that one half of one percent that is so noble, so brave and so dedicated that it will go out and kill and risk being killed for state purposes and the rest of the body politic. We are in a position not unlike the one Washington was in at Newburgh, where regimental commanders were murmuring, “Is there a mutiny afoot? Is there a rebellion afoot?”

No. It is not going to be a man riding on horseback on Pennsylvania Avenue, but it is going to be the disintegration of that instrument that in a *true* crisis is truly going to be needed. And that disintegration is taking place at this moment before this soldier’s eyes in my Marine Corps and in my Army. I should say in your Marine Corps, in your Army, in particular, and it can not happen there without spreading elsewhere.

My son is in the Air Force. My son is a C-130 driver. My son has been in Afghanistan and Iraq on ninety-day deployments flying out of Baghdad airfield and Bagram airfield in Afghanistan. My son just got a call from his Air Force personnel manager.

“We are going to put you on orders in May.” My son is on the Majors list. He says, “Oh. Am I going back to Germany, going to Japan?”

“No. We are going to send you to Iraq as an OIC of road convoys.”

“I’m a C-130 pilot. What are you talking about?”

“We are going to send you to Iraq. You will operate out of the Green Zone and you are going to be Officer In Charge of logistics convoys for the main supply routes in Iraq.”

“Will I get some training for this?”

“Yes. You’ll get about nine weeks of training in defensive driving, in weaponry, in different ways to avoid IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), and so forth.”

My son is my son and he says, “Okay, I’m going to be an infantryman, just like Dad.” He goes to tell his wife and she says, “No way are you going to Iraq.” Now my son is involved in a real middle drill. Does he compromise his family, because she is adamant, to fulfill his orders, or does he get out? And you have to get out really quickly, because Donald Rumsfeld has instituted the draft. We have a draft ladies and gentlemen. It is perhaps the most unfair in the history of America. It’s called “stop-loss” and some 80,000 soldiers and Marines have been caught by it already. And the way it works is you go back to Fort Stewart or some other place and you are getting ready to get out, to ETS (Expiration Term of Service). Your contract has ended and all of a sudden you get put back on orders to Iraq. Your orders back to Iraq put you back in Iraq in the next *three* months, but your ETS is *six* months away. You have just been extended by over a year. We are doing that.

A friend of mine is in the IRR (Individual Ready Reserves) [A manpower pool consisting of individuals who have had some training, who have served previously in the Active Component or in the Selected Reserve, and have some period of their military service obligation remaining. Members may voluntarily participate in training for retirement points and promotion with or without pay.] He’s already done two tours in Iraq, he is in the IRR and he has a couple of years left. He just got his letter. I went to talk to him and I asked him “What are you going to do?” because he really, really has a problem with a third tour. He’s a captain in the Marine Corps. “What are you going to do?” He says, “Well, 20 percent are

not even showing up when they get a call.” I haven’t checked this, but it’s probably pretty accurate. Twenty percent. The Defense Department does not want you to know that. Imagine the cost and the publicity if they went after these people. “So I could do that,” he says, “but I’m really worried because in the future it might come back to haunt me. Or I can just say I’m not going and do like this Captain in Washington, Ehren K. Watada, and say “I’m not going and I’ll go to jail” or I can go back and I’m not sure I can take care of my men. I’m not sure I’ll be the kind of leader they need. I’m not sure I won’t bug out first IED, mentally become of a basket case on the first IED.” And this is what really agonizing to him.

He has some mental problems, some lingering psychological disorders. That’s another story of what we are doing to GIs with PTSD, post traumatic stress disorder, and other psychological disorders. Don’t get me started on that. It’s unconscionable what we are doing. It’s another DOD policy from Donald Rumsfeld’s tenure. My point is, that instrument could disintegrate. And when that happens, it will take ten, fifteen, twenty years to rebuild. That is a long period of vulnerability for a nation whose prestige has deteriorated around the world in ways I have never seen in my lifetime and whose power has diminished along with it.

In the Middle East, I would not give you a nickel for our prestige. Recently, a friend of mine, who speaks fluent Arabic—he was the NSC director for the Middle East for a while—was in Cairo and he wanted to test the waters and see what was happening. So he got into a taxi—that’s the way you go in Cairo to test the waters, you get in a taxi—and asked questions. And he got to this one person and asked him a question about how goes it, what’s the status of things in your mind, and the taxi driver turned around and looked at him and asked him in an Arabic that was unmistakable “I’m not sure what you mean, be more

specific.” And so this gentlemen went back and said, “Just give me a one-word, 25 words or less answer of what your life is like, what your family situation is like” and the taxi driver went thumbs up, “Number one: Mahmoud Ahmedinejad.”

Ahmedinejad is the number one guy for this taxi driver and I dare say he’s the number one guy for a lot of people over there. Because of our feckless policy with regards to Iran, we have a new leader for the radical Islamist world. Actually we have three possible leaders: we have Bin Laden or we have his lieutenant Al-Zawahiri—he’s really the real brainpower behind bin Laden—we certainly have Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah with his defeat, as he’s pitching it, of the Israeli Army starting on July the 12th when they invaded Southern Lebanon, and we have Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. And we are doing *nothing* to defuse these people, and support the moderates who still exist and we are doing *everything* to give these people more leverage, to give them more power, and to diminish our own power accordingly.

This is not the way to run an empire. Even if you have made the decision, as I said before, to be the new Rome, this is not the way to do it. And ladies and gentlemen, unfortunately, we have almost two years left, almost two years left. I hope and pray that I am wrong and that either maximum change will occur with regards to this leadership and I haven’t a *scintilla* of hope that that will come about or that this Congress, in loyal opposition, will do the kinds of things that need to be done to exercise the proper oversight, and I will submit to you that if they did, I think we would do something that our Founding Fathers would find perplexing that we have not done more often. We would remove, in accordance with the Constitution, a certain portion of this leadership. I think our founders would say, “You’ve only use that twice? In the whole breadth of two plus centuries? Tell me when you used it.”

“Andrew Johnson” Give them the circumstances. “Bill Clinton.” Give them the circumstances.

“You have got to be kidding,” say Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Benjamin Franklin, or anybody else. But now, in my view, we have the kind of problems, I won’t call them crimes, the kind of problems that I think the founders contemplated when Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist Paper number 6, and James Madison wrote in Federalist Paper number 4, and in letters when they talked about the real essence of human nature. What power does to that human nature and why you need a series of checks and balances to make sure that human nature does not get out of hand.

We have been neglectful of those checks and balances. I gave a talk in Charlotte, North Carolina, in the heart of evangelical, Pentecostal, conservative America and a lady jumped up in the back of the room and said, “Why aren’t the American people in a rage over what you’re talking about?” And I said, “Ma’am, I don’t know.” And someone said, “Apathy,” and another said, “They don’t even vote anymore,” and another said, “Well, it just doesn’t touch us,” and another said, “I have no son or daughter in Iraq.” And so the reasons started pouring out, but I suspect it’s a combination of them all and maybe much more that we haven’t touched upon. But we need to be in a rage, in my view, because we are not keeping our republic the way we should be.

Thank you.