



Pell Center
for International Relations
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100 Ochre Point Avenue
Newport, Rhode Island 02840-4129

Professor Samantha Power

U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: FAILURE OR FOLLY?

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It's great to be here and it's a true honor to be speaking at a center that has Claiborne Pell's name so squarely attached to it. I'm sure his friends and constituents here don't need to hear from me what an extraordinary internationalist, what an extraordinary moral force he was in the U.S. Senate, and what an extraordinary moral legacy he has left in the U.S. Senate—where I am working this year. But just as crucially, and something I think that is increasingly forgotten, Senator Pell was someone, is someone, who understands the link between America's standing in the world and its security in the world.

These are not separate entities. These are not separate pursuits. You can't be secure unless you're respected, especially these days. I know many of you know so much in Senator Pell's record that one could reflect upon, but I first encountered him when I began work on this book on America's responses to genocide in the twentieth century. [Professor Powers is referring to *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, which received 2003 Pulitzer Prize for Nonfiction.] It was astounding. When it came to the ratification of the Genocide Convention, there was Pell. When it came to speaking out about the Khmer Rouge in the wake of Vietnam, when people didn't want to go back even with just their eyes to Southeast Asia, there was Pell. And perhaps, most notably in my experience, but not by any means most notably in his career, when Saddam Hussein began gassing the Kurds in 1987, 1988, chemical weapons attacks that we have now heard at length from the current administration, Senator Pell was the leader of an effort in the U.S. Senate to suspend, to cut off U.S. assistance to Saddam Hussein predicated on the logic that when you use chemical weapons against your people, you don't get half a billion dollars a year in farm credits—and credits to buy American farm products.

We have to have *at least* that rule in our foreign policy. And Senator Pell, with the help of his rambunctious staffer, Peter Galbraith, who is speaking here in the fall and has

spoken here in the past, but really with the senator's leadership, introduced something called the Genocide Prevention Act in the United States Senate. And as soon as he introduced, initially—who could be against preventing genocide? —there was a voice vote and it looked like it was going to be fine, but as soon as people actually got around to reading the bill, his bill, and saw that it actually required suspending this program to Saddam Hussein's regime, the farm lobby in this country went crazy. As a result of that lobbying—they knew that if this bill went forward, Senator Pell's legislation which was co-sponsored by Senator Helms—as so often Senator Pell managed to do things in a bi-partisan way—if this legislation went forward, then it would be American farmers as well, of course, who would pay the price because those credits could not be used to buy American farm products.

So the tragedy of this period, in addition to what was actually going on in Iraq, is that once the farm lobby began to pay attention to what was about to be taken away from Saddam Hussein, but also incidentally from them, then their lobbying was so effective elsewhere in the Senate, not with Senator Pell and not with Senator Helms for sure, but that actually the aid program to Saddam Hussein in the year the gassing attacks and the year after this piece of legislation was introduced was *doubled*.

So this was not one of those notches in the belt that one could claim. This, however, was the exception to the Pell rule. Normally, when Senator Pell introduced legislation he had more success than that.

But that gives you an idea of how tight we were with Saddam Hussein at that time and how difficult it was for the Congress to step forward and say “We have to put something else in the equation besides our short-term apparent security interests.” Because the logic of the Reagan administration at the time was



that the greater enemy in the neighborhood was Iran. We were the Great Satan to Iran since the hostage crisis. Iran . . . Iran . . . Iran. So we were so embedded with Saddam Hussein, you might say that it took years.

Senator Pell's effort was the beginning of a recognition that Saddam Hussein was not going to be a kinder, gentler dictator anytime soon. And this was simply an effort to say that in U.S. policy we have to have some rules, some standard, some backstop and not simply be making judgments on the basis of expediency, security interests, or economic interests.

I was struck as I was reading Senator Pell's biography on the way from Boston today in the car. It said in the bio and I almost can't believe this is true, that he was the only U.S. Foreign Service Officer and remains the only U.S. Foreign Service Officer to serve in the U.S. Senate. I am so struck by that. I am so struck by the deformity of our process that this rarity ensures.

The Senate is a body of government we rely upon, the expertise and the oversight that we rely upon and yet we are much more likely to see a medical doctor, or a lawyer or even a football player become a Senator than a Foreign Service officer. This gives you some additional idea as to why our process, especially today in sort of wartime, but even through history, has tended to be so deferential to the Executive Branch.

And again, we're *in extremis*, living with that today. We're only starting to see the Democratic Party and even some internationalists Republicans begin to step out, begin to find a voice, begin to feel secure in challenging the foreign policy judgments, tactical and strategic, made by this administration and part of it is rooted in a kind of cult of expertise, some idea that the national security team has access to privileged information that mere senators who are going back to their districts, their home states at the weekend, should be shy about weighing in on issues. We now know what it looks like when policies are made without the

checks and balances and without actually being tested and then refined in the court of public opinion and with the meaningful oversight that Senator Pell was famous for in imposing and ensuring. So I did find myself asking what the world could look like today if the Senate was somehow stocked with Foreign Service officers who had felt, not just in the run-up to the invasion in Iraq, but really, at every stage since the attacks of 9/11, who saw themselves as principals in the shaping of foreign policy, who saw themselves as not just a rubber stamp, or not as just people to be briefed, but people who needed to be truly persuaded. I'd like to test that world. I'd like to see that world.

I'm not going to talk about the Rwanda genocide this evening. What I thought I would talk about today is democracy promotion, the Freedom Doctrine. I'd like to basically do three things. One, I'd like to talk about why we have begun democracy promotion. Why has the United States government begun to advance the so-called Freedom Doctrine? What's up with that? When did that start? Why did it happen? Are they serious? Secondly, I'd like to talk about how we're going about promoting that agenda to the degree that we are and where we are. And thirdly, I'd like to talk constructively, not assuming that it has to be just failure or folly about how it might be done differently, how we might actually think about democracy in a much more inclusive way than we have thus far.

So why has this administration taken up this cause with such fervor? If you look at President Bush's second inaugural speech—and I urge you to if you didn't hear it live—and you close your eyes and you didn't know who was speaking, it sounds like a speech that might have been at one point been written by Senator Pell or might be written by me or by the legions of human-rights minded internationalists in recent American history. With one exception . . .

The democracy agenda that is put forward makes no mention of actually standing with our allies and prosecuting that agenda. That is a noticeable omission. But in terms of what citizens abroad deserve, some notions of what they want, that inaugural address even has a lot of language about deferring to local culture and not imposing a one-size-fits-all version of democracy on people elsewhere.

When did that happen? When did Bush start thinking in these ways? Well, the short answer, of course is Iraq. There were a range of reasons why the United States went to war in Iraq. On that list—and we each have our own judgments about how these reasons ranked and who was motivated by what in terms of the inner circle—it was a kind of hodge-podge. On the list, of course, was some belief that there were weapons of mass destructions. A phrase that was deliberately used because there was a recognition really that there were, of course, no nuclear weapons in Iraq. But if you use the phrase “weapons of mass destruction” and invoke the specter of mushroom cloud, people don’t necessarily read the fine print and know that the only thing you are really arguing that he has are chemical and biological weapons—chemical weapons which he had already used [against the Kurds in northern Iraq.] But there was a belief, I think a genuine belief—the intelligence was, of course, flawed and that intelligence that wasn’t flawed was ignored or diverted out of the system—not in a link to 9/11—I don’t think anybody in the administration actually believed there was a meaningful link and the 9/11 Commission itself found that there was no link, but a sense in the wake of 9/11 that for the United States to get its pride back, for it to be a deterrent again, it had to show its strength and why not show its strength in a place where so much unfinished business was in need of being done, being completed? Why not do it in a place that had expressed hostility towards Israel, which is of course a prime strategic concern of senior players in the administration? Why not do it in a place where President Bush’s father

had come so close to regime change or had at least contemplated regime change? Why not finish the job that his father had started? Why not do it in a place and actually take on somebody who tried to kill your father? That was a factor, for sure—the emotional place that Iraq came to hold in the President.

And then there were people—Paul Wolfowitz is the obvious spokesperson for this view—who actually believed in democratization and who were very influenced by the Iraqi exiles into believing that Iraq could be a magnet, an anchor, a precedent, a model for the region. They thought that a wonderful wave of democratization would spread which would be good for moral reasons, of course, but in the end be good for strategic reasons.

So there was this kind of menu, this kind of hodge-podge of reasons. Different reasons in different weeks might be ascendant, but as most of the recent documents, mostly coming out of Great Britain and all of the books that have been written so far about that period in 2002, 2003, have shown this decision to go to war was made very, very early. And there was opportunism by those who had long wanted, again for their own reasons, to see Saddam Hussein go. There was an opportunism around that post-9/11 consensus that existed in this country and that willingness by Congress and most of us, sadly to defer to the wisdom of the Executive Branch in advancing our security.

So democracy is on the list at least for some, or at least for one, but not terribly high on the list. The problem of course is as Iraq unfolds is that all other reasons kind of melt away. There are no weapons of destruction. There are not even chemical weapons. The idea that he was able to get rid of all his chemical weapons stock . . . We all know that if they'd found a single vial, it would have been bandied about and would have been front-page news. They found nothing.

The link to 9/11, of course, was never real even if it was believed domestically. The idea that terrorists were somehow lurking there, or were going to get support from Saddam Hussein has become a self-fulfilling prophecy that, by going to war, terrorists obtained a playground, obtained a place to take on American individuals and institutions. So you couldn't really make the terrorism argument anymore. And sure, Saddam Hussein was overthrown and you could say a few things, as they have, about torture and tyranny and the importance of ridding Iraq of it, ridding the world of it, but that doesn't take you terribly far because ultimately you were seeing on the television how badly Iraqis were living, how many people were dying and how degraded anybody who touched Iraq, anybody who touched the mess was becoming by virtue of that association.

So elections seemed like something that we could all unite around as the corollary or the opposite of all the bad news. There would be this brief shining moment of goodness, of freedom expressing itself, of people giving the proverbial purple finger to the world. And indeed those elections initially became the benchmarks by which we would measure progress in Iraq, and presumably the benchmarks along the road that would eventually lead to our withdrawal from Iraq. But those benchmarks didn't have that effect in terms of stability, in terms of humanizing the culture, in terms of defusing the insurgency despite all the hope around each of these three elections that occurred consecutively in the course of last year [2005].

But still, if not democracy, then what? I think that the erosion of the other reasons to go to war or the melting away of those reasons tells you a lot about the President's fixation and his effort to propagate this new ideology, or this resurrection of a very old



ideology.

So Iraq is part of it, sort of a combination of instrumental use of Iraq or starting out with a policy that is carried out in one place and then building a doctrine from it for convenience sake. But I think that part of it is, and anybody who hears the President talk about this, a belief that the President himself believes that he is here in order to democratize. That this is moment and that, God knows, the world needs fewer dictators and fewer mass graves and more democracy and that he has been placed in this position by forces larger, or by forces more human, to be the person who takes on this bold project.

So these are just two reasons why I think the Freedom Doctrine has come to prevail. But there's a third. And this is the one I want to spend a little more time talking about because this is the one that is actually a genuine insight about the world we live in today, with asymmetric threats. And that genuine insight is one that was very controversial, that Senator Pell and others had argued for in the 1980s when they were trying to make headways with the Reagan administration in response to Saddam Hussein's horrors. Human-rights minded people who believe that America should stand for something other than short-term needs of itself, perhaps in the interest of serving the long-term needs of itself, couldn't get much headway on this genuine insight. And that genuine insight is that repressive states and failed and failing states make very bad neighbors in the medium and the long-term.

That means that a government like Uzbekistan today, which is boiling citizens to death as a form of death penalty, is likely not a terribly reliable long-term partner in the war on terrorism. And while using Uzbekistan's bases was attractive in the moment, that, again, one does learn something central about the kind of partnership one can have with a particular regime on the basis of its internal human-rights performance.

So let me first talk about repressive states because those are the ones that we hear the most about from the Bush administration. Abuse internally is, as Hitler taught us, a decent predictor. It's not a perfect predictor and I don't think it's necessarily causal, it's more correlative as a predictor, but abuse tells us a lot about the kind of neighborhood force a country is going to be. So if you look at countries like North Korea and Iran where freedom and rights are enjoyed only in the breach, it's not a huge coincidence that North Korea and Iran are the principal proliferators, that they are countries who are intent now on acquiring weapons of mass destructions and quite prepared to endure whatever international stigma befalls them in pursuit of those weapons. Now there's a thousand other reasons, especially in the wake of the war in Iraq, why one might want to acquire weapons of mass destruction in the hopes of inoculating oneself from an American invasion, nonetheless some of the countries, the "rogue states" in terms of the international law and international institutions—I'll get to the United States in a second in that regard—tend to be rogue at home and abroad at the same time. It's very rare that you see a state confining its "badness" within its own borders.

The second point about repressive states is that the United States and other Western democracies have long traditions of not looking inside a country's borders to see, to gauge human-rights performance, and of making strategic judgments about the relationship simply on the basis of what we get out of it. But the genuine insight, again, after 9/11 is that it can be very harmful not only for the people in those countries where abuse is occurring but for the sponsors of the abusive power. If you look at 9/11, for all the talk of the axis of evil in the wake of 9/11, where did the hijackers actually come from? They didn't come from Iran or Iraq or North Korea; they came from two of America's allies in the Middle East: Egypt and Saudi Arabia. And if the testimonies of the savages of 9/11 are to be believed, the principal source of resentment and the principal grounds for attack, in addition to Israel and Pal-

estine and that was that the United States had offered such unconditional supports to the governments in Saudi Arabia and in Egypt over the years while they were being abusive or at least being singularly undemocratic.

So if one thinks about what the presence of asymmetric threats, the ability of non-state actors to commit great harm against the US, one does have to ask whether these kinds of allegiances are doing ourselves any favors in terms of the resentments that we are earning. And I guess that—it's worth stating here and I'll come back to it a later—the idea of neutrality on a state's internal human rights is little bit misty-eyed. I mean in a way, if you are giving aid to a state, if you're conducting your diplomatic relations with the state and not mentioning the arrests of dissidents, or torture, or all of the list of things that one sees in many countries we now know, but if you're not mentioning them, the idea that that's merely neutral is a little bit specious.

For ultimately it is taken anyway as a form of complicity with those abuses and with that repression. That was certainly how US behavior in the Middle East all these years was taken. So when the president came out and said, now going on four years ago, quite boldly at the time, "Sixty years of abetting dictators in the Middle East has done nothing to make America safe," he was right. I don't think it enhanced America's security over time to be maintaining these unconditional, very loving relationships with states that were abusive.

So what about then, the "failed" states? They are also part of the democratization agenda. It's not just about getting rid of dictators. It's also about shoring up states that are—the US military calls them "ungoverned spaces" or "under-governed spaces"—failing, failed states. I think it was Dick Cheney who said quite recently, "We are threatened far less by conquering states than we are by collapsing states." And that is again the sort of new mindset and well

it's probably true to a large degree. Unfortunately, it would have been a good insight to bring to bear in deciding whether to invade Iraq.

But if you look at Afghanistan and the kind of safe harbor that it provided for Al Qaeda and for other noxious elements throughout the 1980s and the into 1990s, you see one cost of allowing failed states to persist. The entire world averted its gaze in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and said "It's not our problem. It's just way too messy. That civil war will never be solved." And into places like that you frequently, throughout history, see elements like Al Qaeda gravitate.

In Bosnia, where I was a reporter, the argument was made first by the Bush administration and then initially by the Clinton administration that we could just build a wall around Bosnia and hope that it would just go away. If we could just stop the conflict from spilling into Greece, Macedonia, Turkey, then it's unfortunate for you poor Bosnians, and we'll do our best in humanitarian aid and with diplomacy and with UN peacekeepers, but we're not going to get involved militarily to actually stop the carnage.

Well, the person who did get into Bosnia at the time was Bin Laden. He got into a country that was collapsing, traveled for much of the 1990s apparently on a Bosnian passport and recruited out of a very vulnerable suffering Bosnian Muslim population. He recruited only small numbers, but nonetheless, again, when these societies get radicalized by war, when basic state structures collapse, there's a vulnerability that the worst elements take advantage of. I look at Afghanistan in the 1980s, and Bosnia of the 1990s, and I think of Darfur of today. Very few people think of Darfur in these terms, but it is a vast desert, a topographical, demographic nightmare where there are almost no functional state institutions other than the air force which comes in and bombs people. There are no resources and ample space to come and do whatever you want. There is no international deterrent in that regard. [Note:

Osama Bin Laden, in a message dated April 28th, 2006, eighteen days after this lecture, urged his supporters to go to Darfur to fight for the “Arab” cause.]

There are other threats, non-traditional threats such as the Avian flu. With failing or failed or under-governed states, how are these kinds of epidemic, if they are part of our future, how are they going to get reined in when you have no basic health structure and health systems? So the democratization agenda, or the nation-building agenda—which is occasionally sort of lumped in with it—grows out of some of these concerns.

Now, quickly, I want to turn to how we’re taking on the task of democratization thus far. Here I think you see, it’s no secret that there is a real emphasis on what we might call “electocracy” rather than a kind of inclusive account of democracy. And, again, I think Iraq is the best example of that. There is a desire to have elections to show *something*, some return, some manifestation or symbol of freedom. But sometimes, and not just in countries where we have security interests at stake, but also in the developing world, you see more often than not, elections being treated by US planners as a finish line. This is what is going to happen in the Congo, we’ll have elections then we’ll pull the peacekeepers out, and we’ll essentially declare victory and go home. Liberia is another place of concern. The concern is that the support that made the elections of Africa’s first woman president, Ellen [Johnson] Sirleaf, will melt away now because the hoopla has died down and there’s nothing about governance that makes good television images.

So what one finds, though, and I’ll be curious if those of you who have spent time in the developing world have the same experience of this, is that often people embrace elections. It is a very human impulse to want to determine your own destiny. I think they view elections much more instrumentally than we do. They view elections as a way of hoping to get people into power who will alter and will improve the basic conditions of their lives. We, in the US,

don't have this mentality about elections because most of us in this room aren't worried about whether or not we're going to have food on the table the next day, aren't worried about sexual violence and HIV in rapid succession, which many, many young girls and women especially in sub-Saharan Africa are worried about right now. We don't see the police—minorities in this country might—don't really see the police as a tool of repression. We see isolated cases of police violence for sure, but in so much of the developing world, the police are the principal perpetrators of the very crimes that *we* look to law enforcement agents to protect us from or at least to punish. We aren't worried about corruption. We don't ask: "Is this new government going to come and clean up the community so that I can make a contract and see it enforced and not have to mortgage my house or my hut as a way of putting my child through school?"

Economic development. The rule of law. Anti-corruption. Freedom from violence in one's life. These are the elements of human security that so many individuals around the world are lacking and craving. And elections are largely, in many countries, a route to potentially getting rid of the old and ushering in the new in hopes that some of these elements can be brought to bear.

Part of how we are doing democracy promotion, of course, is that we are promoting it very straight-faced with no recognition of, mention of, or accounting for, own our deviances of late on the very principles that we are trying to promote abroad. When [Secretary of Defense] Donald Rumsfeld—in those early months when the weapons of mass destruction weren't turning up—came out and said, "We have to be clear. The absence of evidence does not mean the evidence of absence," it's not just us who are the audience for that message and that sophistry. It's the entire developing world. It's not just us who are the audience for

the few “bad apples” account of torture in American detention facilities; it’s the entire Middle East hearing that.

They’re seeing the torture occurring here and here and here and here and generals being deployed from one place to another, presumably to be passing along something as they go. They’re seeing it, like on a map, something that feels very systematic, very consistent and yet they’re hearing about bad apples and they’re seeing that the highest rank of anybody so far convicted in relations to torture in the detainee abuse is a staff sergeant. They’re seeing our entire national security team, the team that led us at minimum into some of the most supreme tactical blunders in the history of American foreign policy and in my view more likely into the greatest strategic blunder in its own terms of fighting a war on terrorism that will be with us for some time in American history, but all these things happen and yet the national security team responsible is still intact.

People, historians, future generations will look back and see that the first member of the President’s inner circle removed in the wake of, however you want to rate this blunder—it’s not going terribly well—the first person removed is Andy Card. *Andy Card?* [Former White House Chief of Staff.] How are future generations going to square that with the record? But equally important how do people abroad, hearing our democratization messages process that disconnect? And how do they process warrantless eavesdropping and the assumption of such executive prerogative?

Where is the oversight role that [Foreign Relations Committee] Chairman Pell was able to perform valiantly in the 1980s and 1990s? Where are those checks and balances? That’s what we are preaching about. When Dana Priest in the *Washington Post* writes a story about black sites, so-called gulags now, these sites that no one knew about in Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, these unaccountable spaces, the Congress comes out and the Republican chairmen

of two of the committees come out and say, “Yes, we’re going to have an investigation, but not of the black sites, but of *Dana Priest* and of the leakers. Who are these leakers?” That disconnect with our democracy promotion, whatever the genuine insight about failing states and repressive states, that disconnect is harming our ability to be a spokesman for this cause right now.

Let me close with six elements of democracy promotion that I think should be embraced and haven’t yet been, but still can be. As I indicated earlier, not looking inside a state and judging its human rights performance, which was the habit of states until quite recently, not to look because of sovereignty, isn’t really an



option anymore because of the welfare of the people in those states. Look at Rwanda and what that would have meant from them and some of the security predictors that I think do lie within. And what you see, especially among liberals, is a real retreat from the idea that the United States should even be looking inside other people’s countries because we don’t have our own house in order and because we’ve made a mess of things in Iraq. If you look at the polls and you now ask people on both sides of the aisle whether they believe the United States should just come home and stop meddling around in other people’s business, or something like that, is how we put the poll question, 45 percent of Americans think we should come home and stop meddling.

There is now a real, deep-seated nostalgia for isolationism, which I think most of us thought in the wake of 9/11 would be vanquished. There is not an attitude of “Okay, how we do this better?” or “How do we do it completely differently?” but “Let’s not do it at all.” There is a real sense of our own capacity both for immorality and for incompetence that

truly chastens anybody who thinks about overseas engagement. So what are these six things in lieu of neutrality, in lieu of false neutrality, in lieu of isolationism?

First: I think what one sees in the way we promote democracy is a kind of instrumental approach. The way we word it is a kind of instrumental approach. The way we word it is not about the intrinsic welfare of these individuals. It really is predicated on the logic that I have described. They'll become a threat to us eventually if we don't shore this up.

And if you're only sort of trying to advance people's welfare for your own sake, it's going to show up at every turn. In part because, especially these days, the United States is so prone to claim credit for any victory, for any orange, green, purple, yellow, red revolution. It's *our* victory even if associating ourselves with the victors, with the dissenters, with the people who put their lives on the line, actually undermines their standing in their own society because of the degree of anti-Americanism right now. What's the expression?—"Credit you give yourself is not worth having." If *that* could be the mantra around our democracy promotion efforts, I think you would see a lot of people in these societies recognizing that it wasn't about *us*. It wasn't about taking credit; it was actually about potentially enhancing *their* welfare.

Second: Economic development. I've already mentioned, we remain for all our talk of democratization, and for all the recognition that people think first about feeding their families and second about going to the polls, we remain next to last among the OECD [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development] countries in terms of the amount of Gross Domestic Product we actually give in foreign aid—and of course so much of our foreign aid, and this was true in Senator Pell's days as well, comes back to American contractors and doesn't actually remain in the societies in question. That has to change.

Third: Rule of law. If we were able ourselves to adhere to it domestically and to embed ourselves within an international legal frameworks and international institutions, again not in some misty-eyed way, but some very, very pragmatic long-term reasons, creating rule of law initiatives, not judicial seminars, but an actual investment in legal structures in developing societies I think that this as a counterpart to elections would bring about meaningful change in people's lives. But again, right now, the rule of law is very, very low down on the list and when we preach it we are increasingly laughed at because of the impression we give others that we want to be above the law or that we want to make our own rules.

Fourth: We have to learn from our democratization. I was at a hearing in February, a very disturbing hearing where Secretary Rice turned up to talk about this democratization agenda. And she was pressed by a number of Senators, not just about Iraq, but about the victories of *Hamas* and the Muslim Brotherhood in recent elections. And she was asked, "What are we learning? This doesn't seem so good for our strategic interest. Do we really want to push elections this quickly in these kinds of societies?" And instead of addressing the question and engaging in what is a really tough question—issues of sequencing and how you get in and do economic development and the rule of law and create the conditions for truly free elections—Secretary Rice challenged the Senators and accused them of wanting to—quote—"stick with dictators like Saddam Hussein who put 300,000 people in mass graves"—unquote. That is a total *non-sequitur*.

The question is how do we do it better? What do we learn from these recent results given that anti-American regimes keep being elected in these places? What does that mean? Does that mean we become more discreet about the aid that we are giving these societies? Do we pull away entirely? Do we still keep pushing? Let's have a conversation about that. This stuff is hard. So she was pushed again and when Rhode Island Senator Lincoln Chafee asked her

the same question—shouldn't we be learning from this—and she said, “Your question assumes that the Middle East was safer than when the ideologies of hatred produced people that flew airplanes into our buildings on 9/11.” That's the response to a question about democratization. That is *not* learning.

Fifth. None of what I've said so far should be implied to suggest that the United States should be doing unilateral democracy promotion. The more universal or allegedly universal the principles that you're espousing, the more essential it is that you do it as part of a coalition. The more important it is that you *show* its universality by the diversity of actors who actually embrace those principles. Then and only then will people see our effort at democratization as actually being about them or being about something other than our desire to impose our own model on other cultures.

Sixth: Finally, we have to be serious about foreign aid, about the rule of law, about economic development, even about patience with anti-American regimes in the hopes that Hamas gets tested and doesn't meet people's needs in the way that voters now think they will. All of that requires endurance and requires sacrifice from us the domestic public and constituents, and so far we've been told in the wake of 9/11—and to my knowledge this is still the message the White House is putting out—to go shopping. That's our way of responding to ask not what your country can do for you but ask what we can do for our country. And if we're serious about actually shoring up failed states or beginning to be a part of an international conversation about polarization and democratization of the kind that actually improves people's lives, we've all got to be a part of it, both in terms of the sacrifices we make and in terms of the oversight and the accountability that we insist upon.

So let me leave it there . . .

Photos by Andrea Hansen